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Abstract: The paper analyzes the policy goals, the policy leverage, the allocations to rural development and the 
new economics and added rationales about what can economics do for rural development, based on the USA 
experience. Paper ends with recommendations, including five principles for rural development programs: 
USDA-RD should take the lead for more interagency cooperation, rural development funds should move through 
the commercial banking system, not around it,  farm payments should be shifted to rural development to support 
an orderly transition to a market-oriented farm sector, matching funding should be emphasized to leverage 
communities willing to invest in themselves, rural adjustment should be actively facilitated by mobilizing entire 
communities rather than by passive and piecemeal rural out-migration. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Rural development is an area of concern among all nations yet in fact there has been 
little economic research and technical assistance that has had much effect on the rural versus 
urban communities. In the USA, there is a recently completed a paper about the Farm Bill and 
rural development that demonstrates this claim, and on which this paper will draw heavily 
(Kilkenny and Johnson 2007). The situation is similar in Europe, and what we have to say 
about Europe will be drawn largely from a recent article on structural policy analysis for 
lagging EU rural regions (Psaltopoulos, et. al. 2004).  We will show that the reason is a lack 
of attention to critical issues related to attention to space and government and market failures 
in a spatial context. 
The issues are discussed relative mostly to the USA. After discussing the specifics of 
the rural development policy in the USA and several issues specific to the USA situation, we 
formulate five recommendations for changing and modifying USA and in fact, rural 
development policy generally. These recommendations reflect the fact that we cannot go back 
in time to restore the rural areas. In fact, the real issue it to apply good and modern economics 
to the situation recognizing the specificities of space and formulate timely policies that are 
innovative and that deal with the problems at hand. 
To answer the theme in the title of the paper, what can economists do about it, the 
response is much. But to deal with rural development policy economists will have to develop 
and apply new techniques, ones that enable them to deal with the location specifics of 
particular communities and regions. Governments will also have too changed consolidating 
efforts and concentrating on policies that require the rural communities to find ways to 
evolve, including evolving to terminate their existence. We have a rural system that developed 
in response to an economic system that no longer exists or needs to be serviced.  
 POLICY GOALS 
 
A convenient way to think about policy goals and instruments is indicated in the figure 
below. General policy goals can be thought of in terms of “restoring” rural structures of the 
past, “sustaining” the current rural structures, or “adapting” rural structures to underlying 
changes. All have some credibility. Restoring structures is appropriate for communities that 
may have been hit by some sort of natural disaster, for example. Sustaining is often suggested 
by rural community members as a policy goal—they want their community to continue as in 
the past. Adapting is a goal that connotes the fact that there is a continual evolutionary change 
and that rural communities need to recognize this and be prepared to actively seek to adjust to 
the underling changes in the economy and society. 
Policy instruments can be classified in terms of three characteristics as well. Generally 
speaking the policies can be focused on “people”, “industries” or “places”. Compulsory 
schooling is an example of a people policy. Social security and low income support policies 
are others. There may be some differences between the impacts for rural versus urban 
citizens, but they are minor. Industry policies involved the support of an industry that is 
important to one sector versus another. Of course agriculture is the example here.  Many 
agricultural policies of nations, including those of the US, are advanced on the basis of the 
assistance they can provide to rural versus urban communities.  In fact, this is often one of the 
corner stones of the rationale for agricultural policies which have for example, subsidized 
farmers heavily in the US. Finally there is spatial policy which is targeted toward particular 
areas or regions. These are relatively new policies and with exceptions have been tried mostly 
recently in Europe with the new rural development pallor. The idea here is to hold the 
government transfers relatively constant but transfer them to regions on a different basis that 
agriculture. 
This policy matrix is indicated in Figure 1, with the alternatives in broad terms 
indicated by the cells. 
 
Figure 1. Matrix for Considering Rural Development Policy 
 
                                                                              Policy Goals 
Policy Instruments                Restoring                          Sustaining                           Adapting 
People 
   
Industry 
   
Place 
   
 
Inside these cells specific policies can be identified which take the character of the two 
features, goals and instruments. Of course there are many which address several of these goals 
and instruments.  But the categorization is of use for getting a handle on the focus of the 
policies and the instruments designed to achieve the goals. 
  
POLITICAL LEVERAGE 
 
One of the ways of understanding national policies is to investigate the political 
support for them.  That is, which groups support the policy debate?  Fortunately, for our 
purposes there is a group in Washington, DC. Lobby Watch, which distinguishes about 80 
types of constituencies that lobby congress on agricultural and rural issues.  About half of the 
top lobbying organizations are in common between rural and agricultural issues note the 
shaded areas on Figure 2.  But, there are significant differences as well.  Note that the top 
types of lobbying organizations for rural development include electric utilities and real estate 
industries.  Both are direct recipients of subsidies from the USDA RD in the form of loans 
and grants.  
Another interesting factor is the absence of groups that represent the rural population 
directly. There are interest groups who represent various aspects of the rural citizen’s 
livelihood, but not a group that represents the rural citizens as an organized set.  This is of 
course because the rural citizens are highly differentiated relative to interests.  Rural 
communities are not a group that naturally comes together to lobby for legislation in their 
favor.  Until they do there will be a gap in the responsiveness of the congress to rural 
development needs. 
 
Figure 2. Lobbying interests for rural development versus agriculture 
 
Rank  Issue: Economics & Economic Development  Issue: Agriculture  
1.  State, Local, Tribal Governments  Crop Production and Basic Processing  
2.  Business Associations  Agricultural Services & Products  
3.  Non-Profit Institutions & Organizations  Food Processing and Sales  
4.  Public Schools, Colleges and Universities  Dairy Industry  
5.  Real Estate Industries  Public Schools, Colleges and Universities  
6.  Electric Utilities  State, Local, Tribal Governments  
7.  Commercial Banking Institutions  Pharmaceuticals & Other Health Products  
8.  Business Services  Business Associations  
9.  Construction Services  Non-Profit Institutions & Organizations  
10.  Computer Equipment & Services  Insurance Companies  
11.  Automotive Industry  Tobacco Production and Distribution  
12.  Securities & Investment  Food & Beverage Industry  
13.  Civil Servants & Public Officials  Chemical Manufacturing & Related Industries  
14.  Pharmaceuticals & Other Health Products  Livestock Industry  
15.  Misc Manufacturing and Distributing  Securities & Investment  
16.  Hospital Systems & Nursing Homes  Commercial Banking Institutions  
17.  Television, Movie & Music Production  Poultry & Eggs Industry  
18.  Agricultural Services & Products  Business Services  
19.  Health Services & HMOs  Misc Manufacturing and Distributing  
 
ALLOCATIONS TO RURAL DEVELOPMENT 
 
Without going into great detail there are several issues that are of interest relative to 
the allocations to rural development in the FY 07 federal agriculture budget.  The first is the 
distinction between “mandatory” and “discretionary” funding in the legislation.  Mandatory 
funding is congressionally designated funding for particular programs. In general, these funds 
are intended to be spent in the way the congress mandates. An issue here is the reductions in 
the rural development funding that were actually mandated. Most of this mandatory funding 
was taken away in FY06 (and in previous years) through a congressional action called 
“chipping”.  The result is and was that most of the rural development funding is in fact, from 
the discretionary part of the agricultural budget. 
The total budget for agriculture is related to program funding, which includes a parts 
of past funding.  For example, most of the rural development funding is related to loans which 
are repaid with the balance used to finance other new loans. If viewed in this context the rural 
development funding picture is not so bleak.  Program levels for FY 07 are presented in 
Figure 3. Note that if viewed as program funding, rural development allocation is projected to 
be about $14 billion, second only to the outlays for farm support. 
 
Figure 3. 2007 USDA Program Levels 
 
Area of Funding                      Amount 
Farm Support                       $38 Billion 
Rural Development                14 
NR&E                                      8 
Exports                                    5 
Markets and Regulation          2 
Research and Education          2 
Food Safety                             1 
 
Again, it is stressed that most of the rural development funding is for loans. The 
discretionary outlays are to cover loans that for various reasons not repaid.  The actual 
incremental budgetary outlay for rural development in 2007 was approximately $1 billion.  
 
NEW ECONOMICS AND ADDED RATIONALES 
 
There are no rural development income transfer schemes, in contrast with the income 
support programs targeted exclusively to farmers. There are no protectionist policies for rural 
non-farm business, in contrast with the policies in place that protect dairy, sugar, and cotton 
farmers. Agricultural economists who acquiesce to farm income support and protectionist 
trade policies but challenge the public good rationale of USDA’s Rural Development Agency 
are simply misguided.  
It is not argued that there should be income support or protectionist policies targeting 
rural areas. But we favor federal government participation in local public good provision to 
ensure that all U.S. citizens, even in rural areas where the tax base is insufficient, have power, 
clean water, roads, civil infrastructure, and public education. And, we emphasize the need for 
mechanisms to provide those public goods without interfering with rural adjustment to spatial 
rationalization. 
An ideal market economy is characterized by five critical features: (1) no externalities, 
non-excludability, or non-rival ness; (2) perfectly costless mobility of factors of production; 
(3) no monopolies nor monopsonies; (4) no barriers to entry, and (5) perfect information. 
Under these conditions there can be a market for everything that matters (even ‘bads’ like 
pollution, and ‘goods’ like child care), and all goods and services can be optimally provided 
by the private sector. In a world with these features there would be just two roles for public 
policy. One would be to ensure the proper functioning of the market. The other would be to 
provide an income safety net, because market mechanisms do nothing for people who have 
nothing of marketable value. 
Even without considering the effects of space and the costs of distance, these ideals is 
not met in rely on location.  A large number of public good activities—such a primary school 
education, human waste treatment, and transportation infrastructure—provide society-wide 
benefits that exceed the returns that can be captured by private producers. Private provision is 
lower than is socially optimal. This is an obvious market failure rationale for public sector 
involvement in water, waste, and transport infrastructure. 
Territory-wide, one-size-fits-all programs to provide these public goods are less 
efficient than locally tailored programs. That is why our country prefers the federations of 
towns, counties, districts, states, and national government comprised of many specialized 
agencies over a single top-down central government. In keeping with this efficiency principle, 
USDA Rural Development specializes in rural local public goods and rural low-income 
housing. Likewise, the Department of Housing and Urban Development specializes in urban 
local public goods and urban low-income housing. 
The effects of space and the costs of distance underlie many more market failures that 
specifically plague rural areas. Factors of production are not costlessly mobile. In particular, 
land is not geographically mobile, so to be inter sectorally mobile, firms must be 
geographically mobile instead. But all sites are not equally profitable for establishments 
because resource endowments, workforces, transport costs, economies of scale, and spatial 
externalities vary significantly geographically and across the rural-urban continuum. Because 
not all sites can sustain competitive economic activity, population is not evenly dispersed 
across space, and it should not be encouraged to disperse more than market forces can 
support. 
The costliness of transportation also undermines rural comparative advantage. The 
cost of transport from remote places can add so much to the delivered price of a rural place’s 
comparative advantage goods that the place simply cannot compete. Transport costs, in fact, 
have the same effect as export taxes. They interfere with a place’s ability to enjoy the gains 
from specialization and trade. Public investments, such as those by the Department of 
Transportation that reduce the costs of transport, mitigate this cost-of-distance problem. 
Public investments in transport infrastructure also help the whole society gain from the 
productive use of spatially immobile resources in rural areas. 
The costs sunk in buildings and infrastructure are a ubiquitous barrier to market entry, 
a fortiori in rural locations where population density is low and the size of the market is 
insufficient to support more than one establishment in a sector. Adding insult to injury, the 
costliness of transportation and communication across space imparts monopoly power to the 
few vendors of goods and services in low density rural markets, and monopsony power to the 
buyers of rural inputs and rural labor. The development of electronic communications and the 
emergence of e-commerce mitigate this kind of market failure, and underscore the 
appropriateness of USDA’s involvement in rural telecommunication. 
There are also numerous externalities that are spatial in nature. Positive externalities 
associated with the density of economic activity include localization and urbanization 
agglomeration economies such as the static and dynamic economies arising from 
establishment co-location, the division of labor, labor pooling, learning-by-doing, knowledge 
spillovers, and innovation. Remote, low density rural areas are disadvantaged in the market by 
the lack of these positive externalities of density. Offsetting the lack of those advantages are 
lower rural rents. But in the same way that the value of productive amenities is capitalized 
into rural rents, the cost of disamenities is subtracted. 
Outward signs that immobility and space-based market failures hurt rural people 
include rural underemployment (usually resolved by out-migration); missing markets (no 
buyers for rural property, higher rural vacancy rates); factor price distortions (lower prices 
paid in rural areas for the same factors of production), under-provision of public goods 
(inequitable access to public school education), price distortions  (rural prices above marginal 
costs of production plus delivery), and low rural wages. 
What these and other issues surface is that much of the rural development policy issue 
is related to space.  Economists have just begun to understand the implications of space for 
market failures and public goods.  In fact, much of the analysis of rural development policy 
will in future will be developed using space and location as key factors.  If we assume away 
all of the space related factors, rural development is not a problem to be addressed by 
government. But of course, this is not the case. 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
  
What do we want from rural development policy? The USDA Rural Development 
Agency’s strategic plan says it nicely: “A rural America that is a healthy, safe, and prosperous 
place to live and work.” Farm policies helped agriculture adjust to having fewer, larger, more 
prosperous farms run by a decreasing number of farmers. Rural development policy should 
help rural America adjust to having fewer, larger, more prosperous rural communities. One 
big difference is that rural adjustment, unlike agricultural adjustment, cannot be accomplished 
one household at a time. Another big difference is that the number of rural citizens consistent 
with spatial rationalization should continue to increase.  
In too many small towns across the Farm Belt, infrastructure and housing continue to 
deteriorate. The maintenance costs exceed local ability or willingness to pay. Should the rest 
of the country invest in communities that do not invest in themselves?  Maybe not. 
Alternatively, are there ways to leverage the activities of rural communities that are “too 
small” or “not quite big enough” to consolidate into fewer healthier, safer, and more 
prosperous rural places? Specifically, we suggest five principles for rural development 
programs. In order of increasing difficulty of implementation, these are:  
1. USDA-RD should take the lead for more interagency cooperation. 
2. Rural development funds should move through the commercial banking system, not 
around it. 
3. Farm payments should be shifted to rural development to support an orderly 
transition to a market-oriented farm sector. 
4. Matching funding should be emphasized to leverage communities willing to invest 
in themselves. 
5. Rural adjustment should be actively facilitated by mobilizing entire communities 
rather than by passive and piecemeal rural out-migration. 
The USDA should lead more interagency cooperation. Because according to law (the 
Rural Development Policy Act of 1980), USDA is the lead federal agency for rural 
development, we feel there are at least four things that USDA should be doing more 
aggressively: coordinate and specialize; minimize redundancies; share or merge some 
operations; and serve as watchdog to ensure equal opportunity for rural constituencies in other 
agencies’ programs. 
The easiest and least costly way to lead is to monitor other agencies that are 
responsible for public good provision and economic development activities to ensure that they 
offer equal opportunity to rural constituents. Less easy but also not costly is to formalize more 
effective interagency collaboration. If the USDA did a better job of acting as a watchdog and 
insuring collaboration, some of the perceived incoherence in U.S. rural development policy 
would be overcome.  The Senate and House Agriculture Committees should be urged to take 
the lead role for rural development by initiating discussions with those other committees 
about how to more efficiently ensure both rural and urban affordable housing by 
collaborating.  
Move funds through the commercial banking system, not around it. The principle of 
working through the commercial banking system is our second no-cost recommendation. 
USDA Rural Development has already been changing in that direction. The Rural 
Development Undersecretary has expanded guaranteed loan program levels while reducing 
grant and direct loan program levels. This trend should continue. In particular, we encourage 
partnering with rural commercial banks rather than subsidizing non-bank competitors of rural 
banks. When the USDA RD acts as a source of funds to be lent at zero interest rates through 
rural utilities and other non-bank entities, it does two things to undermine the health of the 
rest of the rural private sector. First, it reduces the demand for loans from rural banks. Second, 
the balance of a bank loan is typically held on deposit in the local bank that made the loan, 
thereby contributing to local liquidity. With non-bank funds, because it is not certain that the 
balances are held in rural financial institutions, they do not necessarily enhance rural liquidity. 
Increasing the level of participation by commercial banks in USDA’s guaranteed loan 
programs makes financial and macroeconomic sense. When funds flow through the rural 
offices of banks, they will augment rural liquidity and will help avoid rural stagflation.  
Shift funds from farm payments to rural development to support an orderly transition 
to a market-oriented farm sector. The sensitivity of rural bank assets to farm support policy 
motivates our third recommendation: initiate a modulation process to support an orderly 
transition to a market-oriented farm sector without strangling rural liquidity.  
As mentioned, the European Union committed itself to shifting funds toward non-farm 
rural development programs over a dozen years ago. While most EU Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) funds still support farmers, the EU has been reclassifying funding away from 
farm support toward non-farm rural development. The 2003 EU reform of the CAP 
terminated the program of direct payments coupled to production. It established the single 
farm payment, an entitlement to active farmers that is conditional upon meeting 
environmental and other standards (cross-compliance) and is subject to lower (tighter) 
payment limitations. The funds saved by reducing payments to the largest farmers are used to 
finance the expanded CAP rural development policy. The shifting of funds toward rural 
development is called “modulation” (European Community 2003).  
Additional pressure to reduce direct support to farmers comes from our partners in 
international trade. The World Trade Organization negotiations will sooner or later require the 
United States to stop the provisions of support payments to farmers or owners of farmland. 
The blow to rural liquidity could be softened if the U.S. banking sector in the farm belt was 
not dependent on farmland collateral inflated in value by farm subsidies. 
Our specific suggestion to the Senate and House Agriculture Committees is to 
mandate a special temporary commission. The task of this special temporary commission 
would be to figure out how to maintain rural liquidity even as subsidy-inflated returns to 
farmland are reduced. Special temporary commissions are typically “convened to formulate 
recommendations for specific policy or functional areas.”  Temporary commissions are 
appealing because they provide a safe haven for developing policy alternatives, often are 
bipartisan in nature, may involve both executive and legislative branch representatives, and 
typically include experts both within and outside of government. Most commissions are 
designed to address issues in a timely manner and then are dissolved. 
Leverage community effort by emphasizing matching funding. The USDA 
Undersecretary has stated that, “USDA Rural Development does not develop rural America. 
Rural Americans develop rural America.” It is not easy, however, to design mechanisms that 
ensure that all rural citizens have all the basic public goods without encouraging a culture of 
dependency and without undermining rural adjustment to spatial rationalization. 
A proper role for government is to encourage competition. A popular private-sector 
rural development strategy is “place competitiveness.” The public strategy of USDA Rural 
Development appropriately emphasizes rural quality of life as a key goal. Our fourth 
recommendation, leveraging community effort, merges the place-competitiveness private 
strategy with federal strategy of the provision of public goods and rural quality of life. It is 
suggested that this be done by requiring places to compete for federal funding, and that 
disbursements leverage local funding, not substitute for it. 
Our suggestion is neither unique nor new. Paraphrasing the GAO (1996), an equitable 
allocation of federal assistance to local governments is promoted when grant formulas reflect 
three dimensions of need: the number of people potentially eligible for services under the 
program; the cost of providing the services; and the ability of state and local taxpayers to 
support the nonfederal share of financing such services. Funding formulas that reflect these 
three dimensions promote an equitable allocation of federal resources in the sense that if all 
states and localities imposed taxes at comparable rates, comparable services would be 
available to those with similar needs. 
The condition that “applicants must be unable to obtain the financing from other 
funding sources and/or their own resources at rates and terms they can afford” is problematic. 
On the one hand, it appropriately suggests that USDA RD funds are not supposed to supplant 
commercial bank loans or other privately supplied credit. On the other hand, it is a policy that 
provides life support to non-viable rural towns. These rules do not encourage citizens in 
unsustainable rural communities to find sustainable solutions. They support ‘too many, too 
small’ rural communities. They do not leverage own effort and they do not support spatial 
rationalization. 
 Alternatively, rules that state that applicants must be able to obtain a significant 
portion of the financing from other sources, or that funding cannot exceed a portion of eligible 
program costs, leverage only the stronger rural communities. Under equitably applied 
matching funding rules, citizens in weak rural communities may not be able to obtain federal 
funding for critical infrastructure. Other approaches would be needed for citizens in non-
viable rural communities.  
 Facilitate rural adjustment by mobilizing whole communities. The fifth 
recommendation is to enable community-wide spatial rationalization to avoid piecemeal rural 
out-migration, chronic decline, and unlimited dependence on federal funding. Spatial 
rationalization can be accomplished in a variety of ways. The hardest way is piecemeal: that 
is, household by household or business by business, through rural out-migration, relocations, 
business closures, or death. That is how thousands of rural communities have disappeared 
over the past century. The easiest, but lowest payoff way is jurisdictional consolidation. 
Jurisdictional consolidation does not require households or businesses to move: just an 
enlargement of jurisdictional boundaries to encompass the merging communities. 
Jurisdictional merging reduces duplications in the local public sector. It releases local public 
revenues for other purposes, such as the match to be eligible for federal funding of 
infrastructure, if required. As long as matching funding is not required, policies do not offer 
incentives for ‘too small’ governments to consolidate. Just as with household income tax 
policy, there should be a marriage bonus. Unfortunately, under current policies, there are no 
bonuses for communities marry, just penalties. If two small towns can get twice as much 
federal aid than one town twice the size, there is no incentive to consolidate.  
Rural towns that cannot maintain even a portion of their infrastructure should be 
eligible for community-wide relocation assistance. It is important to avoid inducing 
household-by-household spatial rationalization because chronic decline makes the problems 
even worse. For this reason, entire rural communities should be assisted to relocate 
simultaneously. Consolidations of two or more into sustainable-size towns, and conversions 
of rural satellite towns into suburbs, should be especially encouraged.  
Real spatial rationalization is achieved by physical relocations of households and 
businesses. Towns in flood zones, for example, are relocated. The cost per household is the 
price of a comparable home in the destination small town. Instead of wasting away, at-risk 
communities can merge into larger, more sustainable new communities. Instead of sinking 
funds again and again on infrastructure, funds could be spent once and for all in ways that 
help citizens achieve a higher quality of life elsewhere, while keeping each community intact 
and carrying forth its legacies. 
All town residents and businesses should be relocated simultaneously to the same new 
rural destination within the same labor market area. That helps keep the social community 
intact. It also minimizes the impact on the employment status of the relocating workforce and 
farmers. Landmark buildings such as a school, church, town hall or other building of 
sentimental value should accompany the bulk of the relocated population. Funds not spent on 
infrastructure should be spent on the relocations. The merged town could be renamed with a 
hyphenated version of merging town’s names, in the same way that children in Spain carry 
the surnames of both parents. 
 Consolidation is “a four-letter word” in rural America. Elderly people, rural or urban, 
never want to move from their homes. Local elected officials don’t want to merge when it 
means losing their own seats or posts. But isn’t it preferable to slow death through business 
closures, school closures, brain drains, and piecemeal out-migration? Small towns may prefer 
to consolidate when the benefits clearly outweigh the costs. Businesses would relocate if there 
are expected benefits and little downside risk. Rural development policy can cover the costs, 
reduce the downside risks, and increase the benefits of spatial rationalization. Rural 
development policy should stop subsidizing spatial redundancy. If rural development policy 
does these things it will increase economic opportunity and improve the quality of life for all 
rural Americans at faster rate and a lower cost to taxpayers.  
  
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The conclusions of this talk are related to “what economists can do”.  They can 
understand that rural areas like urban ones are changing and not support the policies that tend 
to make populations believe that policies can restore the past.  They can as well argue against 
such federal and state policies.  Economists, however, can support policies that provide basis 
services to all of the population, including rural populations.  Economists can as well be very 
careful about policies that are focused on sustaining rural communities.  All communities 
cannot be sustained. Efforts to support sustaining rural communities must be supported by the 
communities them selves.  Clearly, all communities cannot be sustained at current levels.  
Helping rural communities to evolve with the demands of the system in which they 
operate is where the action is.  But this involved understanding much more about location and 
space then most economists currently know.  Thus there is area for research and technical 
assistance in teasing out these details of the development picture. The benefits of better 
understanding these issues are however great, and can help economists to be of better service 
to rural communities.  Is it better to stand by and let the rural communities decline in a 
haphazard way or to be aggressive and work with the rural communities to help them evolve 
to a more sustainable structure? 
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